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PROSECUTION OF HABITUAL CRIMINALS
WILLIAM E. DOYLE
of the Denver Bar, Chief Deputy District Attorney

The statute which prescribes proceedings for punishment of
second and subsequent offenders, commonly called the Habitual
Criminal Act,' provides in substance that where a person is convicted of a felony and that individual has been previously twice
convicted of a felony in this state or elsewhere, or of a crime
elsewhere which would be a felony here, he shall be adjudged an
habitual criminal and shall be sentenced to a term of not less than
the maximum nor more than three times the maximum on a first
conviction. If there have been three or more prior convictions, the
punishment prescribed is that of life in prison. It ought to be
noted at the outset that this is not a double prosecution for the
same offense; it rather involves proof of a condition for the
purpose of aggravation of sentence. The case of Smalley v.
People 2 sets at rest these questions of constitutional law.
Two fact questions arise in this type of prosecution. First,
is the prior conviction of the grade of felony in Colorado or elsewhere, or is it an offense elsewhere which would be a felony in
Colorado? Secondly, is the defendant the identical individual
who is alleged to have suffered the prior conviction? This paper
primarily will explore methods to be employed in meeting these
issues. It will also review briefly the other procedures.
The information alleges in one or more counts the offense
with which the accused is presently charged. Additional separate
counts describe prior convictions and contain the alleged date,
place, the name of the trial judge before whom the prior case was
tried, the offense for which conviction was had and the institution
wherein the accused was confined. 3 At the time of arraignment, the
alleged prior convictions are read separately to the defendant,
11935 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 48, §555 (1949 Supp.).
,116 Colo. 598, 183 P. (2d) 558 (1947).
3A sample habitual criminal count is as follows:
BERT M. KEATING, District Attorney, In the name and by the authority
of the People of the State of Colorado, further informs the Court that on the
........ day of .------............... A. D. 19 ....... at the City of ----------------State of.........
(or City and County of Denver, State of Colorado) by and before the Honorable
......................
who was then and there a judge of ................... State of .....................
and one of the competent authorities in the premises, (Defendant) by the name
of
.................
was duly and legally convicted of violating the ......................
Statute of the State of ....................... and on the ............... day of ....................... I
A. D. 19 ....... was sentenced to (Name of Institution), and judgment of conviction
was entered on said date, which sentence was duly executed and the defendant
confined in the State (Name of Institution) at (City), (State), pursuant to
said sentence; (contrary to the form of the statute In such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the State of Colorado.)
See Wright v. People, 116 Colo. 306, 181 P. (2d) 477 (1947) to the effect that the
final clause In parenthesis above is harmless surplusage, habitual criminality being a
condition or state and not a separate crime within the requirements of Art. VI, Sec.
23, of the Colorado Constitution.
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and as to each such prior conviction he is asked whether he is
the same person who suffered the prior conviction in the manner
and form described in the information. An affirmative response
is tantamount to a plea of guilty, thus eliminating any extended
proof as to identity. The defendant may deny that he is the same
person or he may refuse to answer. In either case the effect is
the same, i.e., a general issue plea is entered, and the issues of
fact which are thus raised are reserved for trial to a jury. The
case of Smalley v. People,4 is instructive on this question of absolute necessity for specific arraignment as to such prior conviction. The Supreme Court condemned the practice of a general
admission of identity as to all counts.
SEPARATE TRIAL NECESSARY WHERE DENIAL OF IDENTITY

In the event of admission of identity there is no issue for the
jury's consideration. The trial judge is simply required to receive
the proofs of prior conviction of a felony. If there is a denial of
identity, this question must be presented to a jury. Under the
early act, the Supreme Court held that this issue should be decided in the trial of the immediate charge.5 The method which
is to be followed under the present act is outlined in the case of
Routa v. People, 1 wherein it is held that the question of guilt
must be determined by the jury before the issue of prior convictions
can be submitted. It is pointed out in the Routa case that the question of former convictions is "opened for consideration and resolution" in the main trial where the accused takes the witness
stand and subjects himself to cross-examination and impeachment.
In other words, if the accused is willing to forego his right to
testify in his own behalf, he may have his guilt or innocence on
the main charge considered separate and apart from the question
of habitual criminality.
PROOF WHERE ACCUSED ADMITS IDENTITY

A plea of guilty does not obviate the necessity for proving
the prior felony conviction, particularly where it is a foreign conviction. This question was settled in the case of O'Day v. People.7
There the accused admitted that he had been convicted of
violating the burglary statutes of California in one count and of
Missouri in another count. The trial court neglected to hear
evidence on this question, and the Supreme Court held that this
was error. The reason set forth by the higher court was that
Colorado courts need not notice the statutes of other states and
hence there must be proof, at least that the crime was a felony.
It was said:
4Supra, Note 2.
a People v. Wolff, 111 Colo. 46, 137 P. (2d)
.117 Colo. 564, 192 P. (2d) 436 (1948).
114 Colo. 373, 166 P.

(2d)

789

(1946).

693 (1943).
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What "the Burglary Statutes" of the states of California and Missouri are we are not advised. It should be noted that section 551, supra
sets forth certain crimes known to our law and then provides, "which
under the laws of this state would amount to a felony; or, under
the laws of any other state, government or county, of a crime which
if committed within this state, would be such a felony . . ."
Would the violation of the "Burglary Statutes" of the states of California and Missouri, of which it is alleged the defendant was convicted, be one of the felonies enumerated in section 551, supra,
if they had been committed in the state of Colorado? A fair construction of this statute places the burden upon the people to prove
that the defendant is the identical person named in the second and
third counts of the information, and this proof was obviated by the
defendant's admission. The burden also was upon the people
to establish by competent evidence that the defendant had been convicted of crimes in California and Missouri which, if committed
in Colorado, would be one of the felonies specifically mentioned in
section 551, supra, and such proof is entirely lacking. In the absence
of this proof, the court committed error in considering, if it did,
the charges in the second and third counts in the information.

Thus, it would follow that even after a plea of guilty, it is
necessary for the state to satisfy the trial court as to the fact
of conviction and also that the offense was a felony. Proof of the
conviction is relatively a simple matter. Section 555 (2) provides :8
On any trial under the provisions of this subdivision, a duly
authenticated copy of the record of former convictions and judgments
of any court of record for any of said crimes against the party indicted or informed against shall be prima facie evidence of such convictions and may be used in evidence against such party.

If the conviction is a local one, i.e., within the county where
the trial is being conducted, the clerk can produce the judgment
book as to name, date, etc., and testify from that. Where the
convicion takes place outside the county or state, the above statute
comes into play, and the authenticated copy is evidence.
The issue of whether the crime was of the grade of felony is
less simple. If the prior conviction occurred in Colorado, the trial
court can, without straining its eyesight, notice this fact. If,
however, it is an out-of-state conviction, the district attorney
must introduce evidence to this point. He may choose to qualify
an expert and have him testify that he has examined the statute
and that he is of the opinion that the crime specified therein is
a felony. However, a more simple approach would be to introduce in evidence an official compilation of the laws of the other
state.9 The foreign statute can be compared with the definition
of a felony which is found in the Colorado Constitution, Art.
XVIII. If confinement in a state penal institution is provided
in the foreign statute, this definition is complied with.
Due to the severity of the punishment under this act and hence
the close scrutiny to which such convictions are subjected, it is
'1935

'These

COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 48, §555(2) (1949 Supp.).
are rendered competent by COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 68, §1 (1935).
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suggested that a careful record should be made and proofs offered as to every material issue even though the accused admits
identity and thus in effect enters a plea of guilty.
PROOF REQUIRED WHERE ACCUSED DENIES IDENTITY

The problems are much more difficult where the general issue
plea is entered either by an express denial of identity or by the
entry of the denial by the trial court where the accused remains
mute. The issues are the same as noted above, but more care
must be exercised in meeting them. The fact of conviction at the
time and place alleged is again established at least prima facie
by production of the judgment roll or an authenticated copy
thereof, and proof that it is a felony proceeds as outlined above,
but there remains the vital question of whether the accused is
the identical man. If witnesses are available who know of their
own knowledge that he is the same individual, little else is necessary. Arresting officers who were present in court at the time
of the conviction or the judge or clerk are possible witnesses to
this fact. Other possibilities include the warden or a guard from
the institution. They can testify that the accused was received
pursuant to the judgment of conviction. As a further link in the
chain of evidence, the custodian of records of the institution
can identify the photograph and fingerprints of the person who
is alleged to have been an inmate. He should testify that he is required to prepare and keep these records and that he does so systematically and as a matter of routine, and that the particular records were kept in accordance with the established requirements.
Known fingerprints and photographs should then be identified by
the person who made them at the time of the arrest. Comparison of
the fingerprints which were taken at the institution with those
which are known to be the prints of the accused by an expert
together with his opinion that the prints are of the same individual
will complete the chain of identification.
PROOF OF FOREIGN CONVICTIONS DIFFICULT

The difficulties increase where the conviction occurred outside of Colorado. Authenticated copies of the judgment are, of
course, admissible to prove the conviction. 10 Also, the official compilation of the laws of the foreign state are admissible." There
remains, however, the ever troublesome problem of proof of
identification. This is a difficult matter of practice because of the
frequent impossibility of securing the presence of officers from
foreign institutions. Even if the officers are willing to attend, the
operation is expensive and perhaps not warranted in view of the
fact that his testimony is limited to identification of the photo101935
11COLO.

COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 48, §655(2)
STAT. ANN., C. 63, §1 (1935).

(1949

Supp.).
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graph and prints as officlal records of the institution. Another
reason why presence of a witness of this type seems unimportant
is that there is practically no area for defense cross-examination.
Thus it would seem that the presence of the officer could well
be dispensed with.
12
One well-reasoned decision from the state of Washington,
State v. Johnson, has approved a trial technique which allows the
introduction of fingerprints and photographs as official records.
This excellent opinion explains that the basis for allowing such
evidence to be introduced is found in the Constitution of the
United States, Art. IV, Sec. 1, which provides that "Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records
and Judicial Proceedings of every other State." That section
also declares that Congress may by general laws prescribe the
manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof. Congress has enacted a measure which
implements this provision to the effect that:13
All records and exemplifications of books, which may be kept
in any public office of any State or Territory, or of any country
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, not appertaining to
a court, shall be proved or admitted in any court or office in any
other State or Territory, or in any such country, by the attestation of the keeper of the said records or books, and the seal of his
office annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the
presiding justice of the court of the county, parish, or district in
which such office may be kept, or of the governor, or secretary of
state, the chancellor or keeper of the great seal, of the State, or Territory, or country, that the said attestation is in due form, and by
the proper officers. If the certificate is given the presiding justice
of a court, it shall be further authenticated by the clerk or prothonotary of the said court, who shall certify Under his hand and the seal
of his office, that the said presiding justice is duly commissioned and
qualified; or, if given such governor, secretary, chancellor, or
keeper of the great seal, it shall be under the great seal of the
State, Territory, or country aforesaid in which it is made. And the
said records and exemplifications so authenticated, shall have such
faith and credit given to them in every court and office within the
United States as they have by law or usage in the courts or offices
of the State, Territory, or country, as aforesaid, from which they
are taken.

This statute is made to order for the instant procedure. Certainly, fingerprints and photographs are records within the deflinition of the above statute. The warden is a public officer who is
empowered to attest that he is the keeper of the photographic and
fingerprint records of persons convicted of crime and imprisoned in his institution, that the fingerprints are kept in conformity
with law, and that the particular record is that of an inmate who
was incarcerated in the institution at the particular time. The
certificate of the judge in the county or district or of the Governor
2State v. Johnson, 194 Wash. 438, 78 P. (2d)

13R. S. 8906, 28 U. S. C. §688.

561 (1938).
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or Secretary of State as to the official character of the warden and
as to his duties fulfills the other terms of the above quoted statute.
If the documents which are described above are received, there
remains the relatively simple task of introducing the known photos
and prints for comparison and opinion by an expert, and thus
the same evidentiary effect is achieved as that which is accomplished by the presence of the officer or officers.
In the case of State v. Johnson, 14 the procedure which is
outlined above was followed and approved. The conclusion of
the court is as follows:
We conclude, therefore, that the method of proving the identity
of the appellant by introducing certified copies of the fingerprints
of the defendant, and then comparing them with the known prints
in the possession of the witness, was proper and in accordance with
the rules of evidence as approved by the great weight of authority.",

To the contention that this procedure deprives the accused
of his right to confront his accuser, it was said "Documentary
evidence is admissible, and its admission is not in derogation of the
defendant's right to meet his accusing witness face to face for
the simple reason that a document is not a witness."
It is submitted that the use of documents to prove identity
where the convictions are foreign is entirely sound. Such evidence
is well within an exception to the hearsay rule, and, as is pointed
out above, the accuser is not deprived of any substantial right from
the standpoint of cross-examination. The evidence is highly trustworthy, the necessity is apparent, and the right of cross-examination is not impaired. Therefore, if the documents are carefully
drafted, there seems to be every reason for admitting them.
In closing this discussion, one brief word of admonition is in
order. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that this
statute is in derogation of the common law and hence is subject to
14Note 12, supra.

15In State v. Johnson, the court described the forms (which
therein

as

follows:

The

certificate

of

the

warden,

omitting

it approved)

formal

parts,

used
was:

"I am keeper and custodian of fingerprint and photographic records of persons convicted of crime and imprisoned in said prison, and that the said fingerprint and photographic records are kept by me on my files In conformity with law. I further certify

that the annexed is a true copy of an original fingerprint and photographic record
now on file in

this prison; that I have compared the transcript hereto annexed

with

the said original records, and I certify that the same Is a true and correct transcript
of the said original record and of the whole thereof."
There was attached to the warden's certificate the judge's certificate which, folIs the Warlowing the name of the warden, so far as pertinent, was as follows: .....
den at the above mentioned Prison and hath the keeping and custody of the fingerprints, photographs, files and records of the said Prison; that he is by law the proper

officer to make out and certify and attest copies of fingerprints, photographs, filesand
records of said Prison; that full faith and credit are and ought to be given to his
acts and attestations done as aforesaid, and that his certificate of attestation to the
fingerprints and photograph hereto annexed is in due form; that he was such
Warden, Custodian and

going attestation and

Keeper at the time of making and subscribing to the fore-

certificate."

A certificate was attached by the clerk to the effect that the one who signed
the last certificate was a judge, and the presiding judge certifiied as to the identity of

the clerk. These documents bear the seal of the court from which they emanated.
The certificates of the officials in both states are essentially the same.
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strict construction. It follows that the utmost care must be exercised whether the plea is that of guilty or not guilty. In fact,
the statute is so severe that it should be invoked with restraint
and only against the hoodlum10 who commits aggravated crime and
tends to escape detection and and prosecution and is thus a social
menace. In my opinion, this procedure was not intended for use
against the petty offender who is readily caught and who invariably pleads guilty. If prosecutions are selected and tried
with care, the convictions which follow will receive better treatment on review.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PRESS IN
CRIMINAL CASES
MICHAEL G. RYAN*

What is the duty of the press in criminal cases? Those versed
in the traditions of the law would answer this question by saying
that since a crime is "An act committed or omitted in violation
of a public law forbidding or commanding it; a wrong which the
government notices as injurious to the public, and punishes in
what is called a criminal proceeding in its own name,"" the guilt
or innocence of one accused of an offense against the state should
be determined through utilization of time-tested criminal trial
procedures, and the press should interfere with these procedures
as little as possible.
That the press has a duty toward the public in handling
news of criminal proceedings is undeniable, but this duty is a
moral obligation or responsibility which always cannot be enforced by law. That some sections of the press seek to discharge
this obligation with a deep sense of responsibility to their readers
is one of the main reasons for the continued success of democratic
society. That other sections of the press do not handle criminal
cases with appropriate moderation is equally obvious.
Freedom of the press is a right secured by the Constitution of
the United States and protected by state constitutions.
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, or the right of the people to peacefully assemble ....I
No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every
person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on
any subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; and in
all suits and prosecutions for libel the truth thereof may be given in
evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact.,
10 CI. Routa v. People, supra, note 6.
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.

Bouvier's Law Dictionary, unabridged, Vol. 1, p. 729.
United States, First Amendment.
Constitution of Colorado, Art. II, Sec. 10.

2 Constitution of the

